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Abstract and keywords 
 
This chapter examines the politics of trade and investment agreements, and the ways in which 
these interact with the politics of health, at the global and domestic levels.  The chapter first 
examines the operation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its implications for 
health, illustrating this with a WTO dispute between Indonesia and the USA involving the 
latter’s ban on flavoured cigarettes.  It then examines aspects of the “next generation” of 
trade and investment agreements that have particular implications for health policy, notably 
investor-state dispute settlement and regulatory cooperation.  The analytical focus of this 
chapter is on the political processes and actors at the global and domestic levels that interact 
to produce trade policy and its impacts upon health.  
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BAT  British American Tobacco (BAT) 
 
BITs  bilateral investment treaties 
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ISDS  investor-state dispute settlement 
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The politics of health are intimately tied to the politics of trade and investment.  At the 
national level, the latter usually revolves around the presumed benefits for populations of 
greater trade and investment liberalisation (in terms of economic growth), its potential for 
harming domestic businesses and (by extension) certain workers through increased 
competition, and the apparent advantages it bestows on large transnational corporations 
(TNCs).  At the global level, the politics of trade and investment agreements primarily take 
the form of bargaining between nation states, but other global actors, most notably TNCs and 
various civil society organisations, are increasingly making their presence felt.  The key 
actors at both the national and global levels are thus states, corporations and civil society 
organisations and movements.  However, these can be further disaggregated in that states, as 
well as negotiating with one other, have varied internal political institutions that govern how 
international negotiations are approached and how, once agreed, they are ratified.  
Furthermore, corporations in different industrial sectors, and even within them, have different 
interests.  Civil society organisations and social movements that mobilise around (and often 
against) trade and investment agreements may also contain diverse sets of actors with very 
different interests (only some of which are directly concerned with health issues).  All of 
these actors are influenced, in turn, by competing political and economic discourses about the 
costs and benefits of “free” markets and international trade.  Since the 1980s, a dominant 
“neoliberal” discourse has assumed that less regulated markets are better than more regulated 
ones, although the reality of international trade is that it is a managed system, which is the 
product of inter-state bargaining, rather than one of entirely open borders.  
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Trade negotiations between states, and conflicts over trade within them, are focused 
principally on perceptions of relative economic benefits.  Yet, as the system of international 
trade and investment has developed, it has become apparent that these same negotiations and 
conflicts can also have important implications for health.  Health concerns have therefore 
moved from the margins of such processes to attain greater recognition, so that trade and 
investment agreements are acknowledged as important (actual or potential) causes of health 
outcomes for the populations involved. Such concerns have often revolved around the 
constraints that trade and investment agreements may impose upon governments’ ability to 
make public policy that protects and enhances the health of their citizens. 
 
In this chapter, we first outline the key processes of the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
which is the multilateral organisation that brings together almost all countries on trade issues, 
provides a forum for them to negotiate trade deals and resolve disputes, and provides the 
principal legal and normative frameworks governing international trade.  We examine an 
important WTO dispute, between Indonesia and the United States (US) concerning flavoured 
cigarettes, to illustrate the way the WTO system works, the roles of states and corporations 
within it, and its implications for health politics.  We then briefly discuss a number of other 
key disputes with important implications for health.  Following this, we analyse the “next 
generation” of trade and investment agreements, focusing on two key aspects that are 
relevant to health: investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms and regulatory 
cooperation.  Finally, we discuss political struggles over these new agreements, 
demonstrating once again how domestic and global factors interact in the politics of trade and 
health. 
 
 
5 
 
The World Trade Organization and the global politics of health  
 
The WTO was established in 1995, following the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations.  It is 
the successor to the multilateral trade system centred on the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), which governed international trade during the post-World War Two 
period.  The GATT system, and the WTO system that succeeded it, operates on the basis of 
periodic “rounds” of trade negotiations by member states, which negotiate with each other to 
bargain down tariff rates and other trade barriers.  The Uruguay Round agreed to create the 
WTO and added to the GATT a series of new trade agreements, including the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS Agreement, concerned with regulations to protect human, 
animal and plant life and health), and the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement. 
 
WTO agreements, and most other trade agreements, are based on a set of principles aimed at 
ensuring that agreements to remove or reduce trade barriers are applied in a non-
discriminatory manner.  The most important of these principles are the “most favoured 
nation” principle, which stipulates that concessions made to one party are extended to all 
other parties; and the “national treatment” principle, which holds that foreign goods, services 
and intellectual property (depending on the scope of the agreement) must be treated no less 
favourably than like domestic ones once they have entered the market. 
 
When agreeing on the creation of the WTO, the Uruguay Round also created a new dispute 
settlement system, which replaced the weaker dispute settlement process of the GATT 
system.  Under the new system, if a member state believes that another member state has 
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violated a WTO agreement or commitment, it can initiate a dispute via the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB).  If the parties cannot agree, the dispute is then ruled upon by a panel 
composed of trade experts, with a right of appeal to an Appellate Body.  Once a panel’s (or 
the Appellate Body’s) ruling is adopted by the member states meeting as the DSB, the losing 
party must comply with the decision, negotiate compensation to the other party or face 
retaliation in the form of the suspension of concessions (i.e. the imposition of trade sanctions 
such as tariffs). 
 
The WTO’s agreements, and its dispute settlement process, have become important to health 
policy because a number of provisions of the agreements may be seen as placing constraints 
on the scope that governments have to implement domestic laws and regulations in the 
pursuit of health objectives. Put differently, the WTO regime may limit governments’ “policy 
space”.  Most WTO agreements have provisions that make exceptions for national laws or 
regulations that, while otherwise violating WTO commitments, are necessary for the 
protection of human, animal or plant health.  However, such measures are subject to a 
“necessity” test, according to which they must be as least trade restrictive as possible, and 
they must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner, based on scientific evidence and 
international standards, and not a disguised form of protection (WHO/WTO, 2002).  
 
 
Indonesia v the USA on cigarette flavourings 
 
We can illustrate the way the above described system works, and the implications for health 
politics, by examining actual cases of WTO disputes relevant to health. We examine here the 
dispute between Indonesia and the US over the latter’s banning of flavourings in cigarettes 
7 
 
via the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 (hereafter ‘the Act’).  
The Act asserted the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) authority to regulate tobacco 
products, including by setting public health standards for them such as by specifying legal 
levels of tar or nicotine; introduced limitations on the color and design of packaging and 
advertising; and introduced new measures to protect children (Jarman, 2015: 62).  As part of 
the latter, the Act banned characterising flavours from cigarettes, including candy, fruit, clove 
and cinnamon, but exempted menthol.  The intent was to protect youth and children from 
smoking, since it was believed that they are more likely to be attracted to flavoured 
cigarettes.  
 
In June 2010, Indonesia requested the establishment of a WTO dispute panel, arguing that the 
banning of clove cigarettes was discriminatory, given that menthol cigarettes had been 
exempted.  Indonesia is the world’s fifth largest cigarette market, with the tobacco industry 
exerting a high level of influence on government policy (Hurt et al., 2012: 306).  Clove 
cigarettes (known as “kreteks”) are the main form of tobacco consumption in Indonesia.  The 
country is the largest exporter of such cigarettes to the US and other countries.  While the 
clove cigarette market is small in the US, most clove cigarettes are imported, whereas most 
menthol cigarettes are produced domestically (Jarman, 2015: 64).  Menthol is the most 
popular flavoured cigarette in the US, with a large market among African Americans.  The 
Indonesian government argued that the differential treatment of clove and menthol cigarettes, 
which should be regarded as like products, was discriminatory and therefore violated both the 
GATT and the TBT Agreements, and further that the US measure was more trade restrictive 
than necessary to protect human health (WTO, 2014). 
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The WTO dispute panel concluded in September 2011 that the US act violated WTO law, by 
treating like products differently, although it rejected Indonesia’s claim that the US measure 
was more trade restrictive than necessary.  The US then appealed, with the Appellate Body 
upholding the panel’s original ruling, although with some minor differences in the 
interpretation of the relevant agreements (see McGrady and Jones, 2013, for a full legal 
analysis).  Given that the banning of clove cigarettes, alongside the continuing allowance of 
the sale of menthol cigarettes, constituted discrimination between like products under WTO 
law, the US government faced the choice of whether to bring its laws into conformity with 
WTO law, by allowing the sale of clove cigarettes or banning menthol cigarettes, or refuse to 
do so and face sanctions. 
 
The manner in which the dispute was ultimately resolved tells us as much about the global 
politics of trade and health as it does about the formal legal processes within the WTO.  First, 
the US government had to consider the domestic implications of banning menthol cigarettes.  
Both scientific and political considerations were relevant.  In terms of the scientific evidence 
on the effect of menthol in masking the harshness of tobacco, the US argued in the dispute 
that clove cigarettes were more attractive to young people, and therefore posed a greater 
health risk than menthol cigarettes.  However, the panel and the Appellate Body ruled that 
menthol and clove cigarettes had the same characteristics in terms of their effect on rates of 
youth smoking (McGrady and Jones, 2013).  The US also argued that it was legitimate to 
exempt menthol cigarettes from the ban because to include them might lead to a large number 
of citizens experiencing sudden withdrawal from nicotine addiction, and a large rise in illicit 
trade.  Both claims were rejected by the Appellate Body, since ordinary cigarettes would still 
be available (McCabe Centre for Law and Cancer, 2014). 
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When first passing the Act, the US government had in fact postponed a decision on whether 
to ban menthol cigarettes, instead asking the FDA’s Tobacco Products Scientific Advisory 
Committee (TPSAC) to investigate the issue.  The TPSAC reported that menthol cigarettes 
have an adverse impact on public health because they increase the likelihood of 
experimentation by young people and African Americans; increase the likelihood of 
addiction and the degree of addiction in youth smokers; decrease the likelihood of smoking 
cessation, particularly for African American smokers; and that marketing of menthol 
cigarettes increases the prevalence of smoking for the whole population,  for youths and for 
African Americans (TPSAC, 2011).  Especially concerning was “the high rate of menthol 
cigarette smoking among youth and the trend over the last decade of increasing menthol 
cigarette smoking among 12-17 year olds, even as smoking of non-menthol cigarettes 
declines” (TPSAC 2011: 220).  A further report was commissioned from the FDA, arriving at 
similar conclusions to the TPSAC report (FDA, 2013), and a consultation on the issue held in 
2013, following the ruling of the WTO’s Appellate Body. 
 
However, the banning of menthol cigarettes would have constituted a political problem. 
Menthol cigarettes comprised at least 20% of the overall US cigarette market.  
Approximately 29% of all menthol smokers are African American, and more than 80% of 
African American smokers use menthol cigarettes (Rock et al., 2010: 117-119).  As a distinct 
population of voters, African American smokers represented a potential political obstacle to 
the banning of menthol cigarettes, with some African American organizations publicly 
criticizing the idea of a ban (Glanton, 2010).  Other African American organizations saw the 
exemption of menthol from the ban as a form of discrimination against the African 
Americans whose health would inevitably be harmed by the continued consumption of 
menthol cigarettes (Glanton, 2010).  Some authors highlighted the concerted menthol 
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cigarette marketing campaigns tobacco companies had run over a number of years, 
specifically targeting African Americans in low-income urban areas (Cruz et al., 2010).  The 
issue was then seen as one of social justice as well as of public health (Gardiner and Clark, 
2010).  Seven former federal health secretaries, from both Democratic and Republican 
administrations, sent a letter to members of the Senate and the House of Representatives 
arguing that the exemption of menthol “caves to the financial interests of tobacco companies 
and discriminates against African-Americans… It sends a message that African American 
youngsters are valued less than white youngsters” (cited in Saul, 2008).  
 
The tobacco industry constituted a further political obstacle to a menthol ban.  The main 
producer of menthol cigarettes in the US was Lorillard, which earned approximately 90% of 
its revenues from just one menthol brand, with Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds (RJR) having 
smaller shares of the menthol market (Zajac, 2011).  Large tobacco companies engage 
extensively in lobbying in the US and elsewhere (Givel and Glantz, 2001; Holden and Lee, 
2009).  Lorillard and RJR had in fact sued the FDA, arguing that key members of TPSAC 
had conflicts of interest that should have barred them from participating in the report (Zajac, 
2011).  While this legal challenge was ultimately rejected on appeal (Myers, 2016), the case 
indicates an attempt by Lorillard to discredit the findings of TPSAC.  Furthermore, there was 
strong opposition to a ban on menthol from Republicans, who held a majority in the House of 
Representatives.  It has been observed that President Obama may have been reluctant to 
engage in another political battle while embroiled in defending his healthcare reforms and 
negotiating over the federal deficit (Zajac, 2011; Siegel, 2011).  Furthermore, the tobacco 
control community was split on the issue of exempting menthol, since this was the result of 
an uneasy compromise between the industry and some tobacco control advocates (Siegel, 
2011). Tobacco control advocates supporting this compromise argued that it was a necessary 
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trade-off to ensure the industry conceded the FDA’s authority to regulate tobacco products, 
which the industry had previously been successful in legally challenging (Jarman, 2015: 64).  
However, the divisions among public health advocates on this issue allowed the tobacco 
industry to dominate the public discourse, claiming that a ban on menthol cigarettes would 
lead to an increase in illicit trade (Cheyne et al., 2014). 
 
A WTO ruling in a case such as this would normally lead to a change in national-level law or 
relevant regulations to bring it into compliance.  In this case, this would have meant the US 
government either banning menthol cigarettes too or allowing the sale of clove cigarettes.  
However, the evidence in favour of a ban on flavoured cigarettes in general, including clove, 
had already been accepted by the US government when passing the Act, and had also been 
accepted by the WTO panel and Appellate Body as legitimate (as long as undertaken in a 
non-discriminatory manner).  Thus, amending the Act to allow the sale of clove cigarettes 
was not a satisfactory solution.  The domestic political obstacles to US compliance, therefore, 
led the US to take measures short of banning menthol, including releasing the FDA’s 
scientific evaluation of menthol cigarettes, developing a youth education campaign, 
providing information on the health risks posed by menthol cigarettes through a website, and 
educating the public through the National Cancer Institute website (McCabe Centre for Law 
and Cancer, 2014). Where a complaining member state believes a defending state has not 
complied with a WTO disputes ruling, the affected state can apply for the right to suspend 
concessions (i.e. implement sanctions), as Indonesia then did. When the US objected, the 
matter was referred to WTO arbitration.  However, before an arbitration decision was 
returned, the two governments announced a memorandum of understanding and the WTO 
process then ceased. 
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Under the negotiated settlement, the US Act remained in force, but the US government 
agreed not to impede market access by Indonesian clove cigars and cigarillos, at least until 
new non-discriminatory measures could be introduced (ICTSD, 2014; McCabe Centre for 
Law and Cancer, 2014).  This was in the context of Indonesian clove cigarette manufacturers 
having adapted clove cigarettes into cigars and cigarillos to circumvent the ban. The 
settlement also involved a number of trade-related matters not directly connected to the clove 
cigarettes dispute.  These included a commitment by the US that it would not submit a WTO 
challenge regarding unrelated mineral export restrictions imposed by Indonesia; a 
commitment by the US to grant additional “facilities” to Indonesia should Congress 
reauthorize the Generalized System of Preferences, a trade program to support less-developed 
countries; and that the two countries would intensify negotiations to strengthen intellectual 
property rights in Indonesia (ICTSD 2014; Needham 2014).  They also agreed to intensify 
their cooperation via the Indonesia-US Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), 
a mechanism for regular trade talks between the two countries. 
 
The extent to which the final settlement benefits Indonesia is unclear.  It appears that the 
domestic political obstacles to US compliance with the WTO panel and Appellate Body led 
the government to seek a solution via direct negotiation with Indonesia.  This raises important 
questions about the informal power that states with large economies like the US have within 
the WTO system, and the actual capacity of low and middle-income countries (LMICs) to use 
and benefit from the dispute settlements process.  The WTO operates on the formal basis that 
member states are equal within its processes, and it was assumed that the move to binding 
third-party arbitration upon the implementation of its dispute settlement process in 1995 
would favour poorer and smaller states (Smith, 2004).  Yet, the uneven wealth and power of 
WTO members means that this may not be the case in practice.  LMICs often lack the legal 
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capacity to prepare and carry through disputes to the same extent as high-income countries 
(HICs), thus affecting decisions about whether to initiate and prosecute disputes (Guzman 
and Simmons, 2005; Busch et al, 2008).  HICs may also threaten to withdraw other benefits 
such as aid or trade preferences, putting informal pressure on potential complainants (Smith, 
2004: 548).  Despite the formal legal process of WTO dispute settlement, inter-state 
bargaining takes place throughout it, including before the formal initiation of a dispute; 
during the dispute process; and following a ruling, where agreement on implementation can 
avoid the application of formal sanctions (Tallberg and Smith, 2014).  States with greater 
market size and, therefore, lower vulnerability to sanctions are more able to resist or delay 
compliance, even when they have been found in breach of WTO law (Tallberg and Smith, 
2014).  
 
The Indonesia-US dispute thus demonstrates how domestic and international politics, and the 
varied actors within each that assert their interests, serve to intertwine the politics of trade 
and health.  In this case, the US was able to work out an uneasy compromise that allowed it 
to continue to ban most flavoured cigarettes, which may be regarded as a positive 
development for the protection of health.  Yet menthol cigarettes and clove cigars continue to 
be sold despite scientific evidence that banning them would advance public health.  
Furthermore, the final agreement between the US and Indonesia was reached outside the 
formal mechanisms of the WTO dispute process, in a manner that suggests that large or high-
income countries such as the US can circumvent panel rulings in ways that smaller or lower-
income countries would not be able to.  
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Other WTO disputes and the global politics of health 
 
Other WTO disputes involving tobacco control also illustrate the implications of WTO law 
for the global politics of health. A GATT dispute between the US and Thailand in 1989 was 
instrumental in forcing the Thai government to allow transnational tobacco companies 
(TTCs) access to the Thai market (Vateesatokit et al., 2000).  More recently, disputes 
involving tobacco have been increasing within the WTO, in many cases with LMICs the 
complainants, despite their relative lack of legal capacity.  In such cases, these governments 
may act as surrogates for TTCs, which have been marginalised from the policy-making 
process in many HICs (Eckhardt et al, 2016).  A particularly important example is the WTO 
disputes initiated by Ukraine (later withdrawn), Honduras, Dominican Republic, Cuba and 
Indonesia against Australia’s introduction of plain packaging, claiming intellectual property 
rights violations, with Philip Morris International (PMI) and British American Tobacco 
(BAT) paying the legal expenses of some of the complainant countries (Eckhardt et al., 
2016).  Lobbying and various forms of assistance or inducement may therefore lead to WTO 
member states acting as proxies for corporate interests, with a shift from HICs to LMICs as 
the complainants (Eckhardt and De Bievre, 2015).  
 
WTO agreements also have implications for the politics of other major health issues.  For 
example, the TRIPS Agreement may impact on the affordability of medicines in LMICs 
(Smith et al., 2009).  GATS, meanwhile, has potentially far-reaching consequences for the 
delivery of health services, primarily because it raises questions about the extent to which 
governments can protect state provided or financed services from commercial competition 
(Holden, 2014).  While there has not yet been a significant GATS dispute relating to health 
services, there have been important WTO disputes in other areas relating to health.  For 
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example, the US and Canada initiated a dispute against the European Union (EU) in 1996 to 
challenge the latter’s imposition of a ban on the import of hormone-treated beef (WTO, 
2016).  While the case is extremely complex, the panel found in favour of the US and Canada 
on the basis that there was not sufficient evidence of the harmfulness of the hormones.  The 
dispute is of particular relevance because it casts doubt on the extent to which WTO panels 
will take account of the “precautionary principle”, which states that, in the absence of 
scientific consensus, the burden of proof that something is not harmful rests with those taking 
the relevant action (in this case, using certain hormones in the rearing of beef). The WTO 
agreement dealing most explicitly with food standards, the SPS agreement, allows 
governments to put in place provisional measures to protect health where scientific evidence 
is inconclusive, but these must be temporary while further information is sought to clarify the 
risk (WHO/WTO, 2002: 67-68).  In another example, Canada filed a complaint against 
France in 1998, arguing that France’s imposition of a ban on chrysotile asbestos treated 
imported asbestos less favourably than domestic asbestos substitutes.  In this case, the WTO 
Appellate Body ruled in France’s favour on the basis that the ban was a legitimate measure to 
protect health (WTO, 2010; WHO/WTO, 2002).  
 
However, it is not only WTO agreements that are significant for health. Recent decades have 
seen the emergence of numerous bilateral and regional trade and investment agreements, 
which have potentially wide-ranging health impacts. A key feature of the WTO system is that 
it is premised upon bargaining between states, which have de jure equivalence, despite their 
de facto differences in terms of their economic and political power. This inter-state 
bargaining has led to deadlock in the most recent WTO negotiating round, the Doha Round.  
China’s increased weight in the global economy, and its membership of the WTO since the 
beginning of the Doha Round in 2001, has allowed it to build an alliance with other “BRICS” 
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countries (Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa) that has led to stalemate in WTO 
negotiations with the US and the EU.  This stalemate was the spur for the launch by the US 
and the EU of negotiations for a new set of trade and investment agreements outside of the 
mechanisms of the WTO.  In the next section, we discuss some of the health implications of 
these “next generation” agreements.  
 
 
Conflicts over “next generation” trade and investment agreements 
 
Given the continued foundering of WTO negotiations, the two most important among the 
new agreements are the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). TTIP is a proposed agreement between the EU and the US, 
whereas TPP includes the US and 11 countries in the Pacific Rim. At the time of writing, 
negotiations for TTIP were ongoing and, while the TPP negotiations had been finalised, the 
agreement had not been ratified prior to the US Presidential elections in November 2016.  
Following the election of Donald Trump, it remained unclear whether either agreement 
would be successfully concluded and enter into force.  A third agreement, the Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada was signed on 30
th
 
October 2016 and, at the time of writing, was awaiting ratification by the Canadian 
government, EU institutions, and the 28 member states. While it would be possible to 
provisionally apply CETA pending its ratification, this process may be further complicated 
by the decision of the United Kingdom (UK) to leave the EU, and the subsequent 
negotiations over the terms of exit.  Despite the uncertainty surrounding these agreements, 
they remain important to discuss because they illustrate the partial bypassing of the WTO 
system.  They also typify the kind of provisions that the world’s most powerful states have 
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sought to incorporate in parallel structures, which may form the basis of future trade 
agreements, but which have given rise to extensive controversy.   
 
Provisions contained within TPP, TTIP and CETA are noteworthy for the ramifications they 
are likely to have for the wider global trading system.  These agreements signified a 
substantial, qualitative change in the very nature of international trade agreements.  It has 
been argued that the current generation of agreements are not, in fact, trade agreements at all 
in the traditional sense.  Historically, such agreements have dealt principally with trade in 
goods, rather than services, and with the removal of tariffs and tariff-equivalent measures 
such as quotas.  However, for countries such as the US and EU member states, much of the 
heavy lifting has already been completed in these areas by successive advances in the 
multilateral trading regime.  Despite some exceptions, tariffs on the trade of manufactured 
goods between advanced economies have fallen to historically low levels in recent decades.  
The pursuit of further trade liberalization among these states has therefore shifted its focus to 
other, more indirect, non-tariff barriers to trade, which are seen as having significant trade-
distorting effects.  These include measures that are less about trade, in a straightforward 
sense, and more about transnational investment arrangements and “behind the border” 
measures affecting national regulatory standards.  The focus on such measures necessitates 
even greater engagement with domestic laws and public policies, which may deliberately, or 
inadvertently, have trade-diversionary or discriminatory effects.  If concluded, these 
agreements would create a powerful precedent regarding the type of provisions that should be 
included in future trade and investment agreements. Two aspects of this shift are particularly 
important for the politics of health:  investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) and regulatory 
cooperation.  Below, we discuss each of these in turn, before concluding with a discussion of 
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the political struggles around the adoption of the agreements and the incorporation of these 
measures within them.  
 
 
Investor-state dispute settlement, corporate interests and health 
 
ISDS mechanisms have existed for some time within Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) 
dating back to the Germany-Pakistan BIT in 1959.  The number of BITs expanded hugely 
during and after the 1990s, with over 2,500 now in existence.  However, the principle of 
ISDS became increasingly controversial following its proposed incorporation within TPP, 
TTIP and CETA.  ISDS mechanisms seek to reassure transnational investors – predominantly 
TNCs – that their investments will be safe from arbitrary expropriation, and that they will be 
subject to “fair and equitable treatment”, and thus allow them to initiate disputes directly with 
governments where such guarantees appear to have been violated (McGrady, 2012).  ISDS 
mechanisms were introduced initially in BITs between high-income and low-income 
countries, as an antidote to concerns about the effectiveness of legal systems in LMICs 
receiving investment and the ability of investors to be able to fully guarantee their property 
rights within existing legal structures.  The proposed inclusion of ISDS provisions within 
TTIP – an agreement between two advanced capitalist economies with highly developed 
independent legal systems – has proved particularly controversial. Civil society movements 
across the relevant countries have mobilised against all three agreements, and subsequent 
opposition by some leading politicians and major political parties has meant that the passage 
of the agreements through the relevant parliaments is far from guaranteed, as we explain 
below.  
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ISDS has been particularly controversial because of the direct, and exclusive, rights it gives 
to corporations to initiate disputes with governments.  While in the WTO system corporations 
can lobby member states to initiate disputes on their behalf, under ISDS mechanisms 
corporations have legal standing to initiate disputes directly with “host” governments.  ISDS 
mechanisms are also not overseen by a multilateral body such as the WTO, but operate on the 
basis of a variety of ad hoc panels composed of trade and investment lawyers who, it has 
been argued, have a material interest in ruling in favour of corporations in order to ensure a 
continued flow of cases (Eberhardt and Olivet, 2012).  The fragmentary nature of this system 
also means that the outcomes of arbitration processes are often inconsistent and highly 
unpredictable, with disparate judgements in multiple tribunals precluding the emergence of a 
unified and coherent body of trade and investment case law (Van Harten, 2007). 
 
The important implications of ISDS mechanisms for health are highlighted by the initiation 
of two BIT disputes by PMI, against the Australian and Uruguayan governments, contesting 
their respective regulations on cigarette packaging (Hawkins and Holden, 2016).  In both the 
case against Uruguay under the Switzerland-Uruguay BIT and against Australia under the 
Australia-Hong Kong BIT, PMI argued that by placing extensive limits on the design of 
cigarette packs these governments had deprived the company of its intellectual property 
rights and prevented it from freely using its trademarks.  While the panels in both disputes 
ultimately found in favour of the respective governments, there is evidence that the initiation 
of these disputes has worked as a disincentive to other governments, particularly LMICs, to 
pursue similarly stringent cigarette packaging requirements for fear of incurring similar legal 
action (Hawkins and Holden, 2016).  Moreover, the governments in both cases incurred 
substantial legal costs and devoted significant human resources to defending their policies. 
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These resources were thus diverted from other governmental tasks, including the provision 
and management of health services. 
 
Hawkins and Holden (2016) argue that the fragmentation and complexity that characterise 
the international trade and investment regime, where a “spaghetti bowl” of WTO, regional 
and bilateral agreements overlay each other, presents a multiplicity of channels through 
which corporations may challenge laws designed to protect public health, but which work 
against their business interests.  The conclusion of each new agreement that includes ISDS 
provisions creates an additional potential “veto point” (Hawkins and Holden, 2016).  This 
allows TNCs to “venue shop”, that is, to seek out and exploit the agreements under which 
they are most likely to achieve their goals.  Corporations may initiate parallel disputes in any 
of these potential venues, including suits within domestic legal systems, challenges lodged by 
governments on corporations’ behalf within the WTO system, and direct disputes initiated by 
TNCs using ISDS mechanisms within bilateral or regional agreements.  Precisely such an 
array of disputes was initiated by TTCs against the Australian government’s plain packaging 
law.  For corporations, the intent is to overturn the targeted law, and discourage other 
governments from adopting similar measures.  Such tactics are likely to be particularly 
effective against LMICs which have limited capacity to fight such legal disputes on any one, 
let alone all, of these fronts.  In response to the threat of trade litigation by TTCs, Bloomberg 
Philanthropies and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation created an Anti-Tobacco Trade 
Litigation Fund in March 2015, to support LMICs being sued by tobacco companies 
(Tobacco Free Kids, n.d.). 
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Regulatory cooperation and health 
 
As discussed in the previous section, ISDS measures introduce a mechanism through which 
investors can seek ex post remedies to unfair or discriminatory practices which contravene 
the principles of trade agreements.  Both TPP and TTIP, however, proposed moving beyond 
this to include more robust ex ante mechanisms to ensure national laws remain in accordance 
with a state’s obligations under the agreement.  While the TPP includes a chapter on 
“regulatory coherence”, the draft TTIP agreement includes chapters on both regulatory 
coherence and “regulatory cooperation”.  The latter is designed as a form of monitoring and 
oversight of proposed domestic legislation before its adoption.  However, since the TTIP 
agreement remains under negotiation, the precise details of how this would function in 
practice, the institutional structures which would oversee and administer it, and the degree of 
access this would afford to private stakeholders such as TNCs remains uncertain.  This 
section focuses principally on TTIP, as the most far-reaching set of proposals in this area, but 
many of the concerns raised here are pertinent to discussions about the impact of other 
agreements such as TPP. 
 
The process of negotiation at an inter-regional level for TTIP is analogous to that undertaken 
within the EU during the completion of the single internal market (SIM) (see Egan, 2001).  In 
order to create a genuinely European market, the European Commission sought to harmonize 
production and safety standards in specific areas to create common benchmarks, which all 
producers must adhere to regardless of national origin.  In other areas, where harmonization 
was deemed unnecessary or impractical, the norm of mutual recognition was established 
whereby products legally produced, and deemed safe to bring to market in any member state, 
must be accepted within other EU states.  Like the SIM project, TTIP necessitates the 
22 
 
formulation of either common standards (harmonization), on issues such as food safety and a 
range of other issues, or mutual recognition of standards between the US and the EU.  
Regulatory cooperation mechanisms are designed to ensure that proposed laws do not 
undermine either regime.  If ISDS is a mechanism of redress, in cases in which the 
fundamental principles of the agreement are seen to have been infringed by government acts, 
regulatory cooperation is designed to avoid such instances occurring in the first place. 
 
Critics of TTIP have highlighted the importance of the Regulatory Cooperation Chapter 
within the agreement on similar grounds to ISDS mechanisms.  The establishment of 
processes and structures which would see draft laws on both sides of the Atlantic scrutinized 
prior to their adoption, and perhaps even their formal proposal, has clear implications for 
democratic accountability and legislative sovereignty.  It affords corporate actors a 
potentially powerful mechanism through which to influence policy at the pre-proposal stages 
of the legislative process.  The ability to set agendas and shape legislation at the very earliest 
juncture has long been identified as a key aspect of the exercise of political power (Bachrach 
and Baratz, 1962).  Similarly, scholars of behavioural economics have long understood the 
importance of initial proposals in ‘anchoring’ subsequent negotiations (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974).  This has fuelled concerns that, like ISDS, regulatory cooperation may 
have a “chilling effect” on legislative programs, with governments reluctant to regulate in the 
public interest in areas such as health and safety, the environment and social policy, where 
these may be seen by businesses as imposing burdens.  Where governments are prepared to 
propose new measures, the existence of regulatory cooperation mechanisms may create an 
additional veto point (or potentially a series of veto points) in ways which have been explored 
above in relation to ISDS mechanisms (Hawkins and Holden, 2016).  Without previous, real 
world examples to examine, as in the case of ISDS, we are forced to speculate about the 
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effects on health.  However, it is highly likely that health policies, where they might 
undermine corporate profits or business models, would be challenged through such measures, 
creating a bias towards the status quo. 
 
The ability of external actors to see and comment on domestic legislation, prior to its 
adoption by democratically-elected governments, represents a key development in the 
international trading regime.  It creates the potential for foreign governments and 
transnational corporations to influence policy debates at the earliest stage of the process; the 
stage at which it is most likely these actors can amend proposals and shape the content in 
ways amenable to their particular interests.  The proposals would create a potential pre-
legislative “veto point”, which proposals would have to negotiate before becoming law.  The 
ability to stymie or water down proposed measures, before they come into force, offers a 
significant strategic advantage to corporate actors wishing to shape the regulatory 
environment.  In this sense, regulatory cooperation mechanisms may represent an even 
greater cause for concern for global health advocates than ISDS mechanisms, if they are able 
to block or dilute proposals for food safety standards or other laws designed to protect public 
health. 
 
 
Political struggles over the new agreements 
 
The controversy around the issues discussed in this section led to the mobilisation of civil 
society groups against TPP, TTIP and CETA, and a heated debate in all countries party to the 
agreements.  Against the backdrop of the PMI ISDS disputes with Uruguay and Australia, 
this led to discussion during the negotiation of the TPP as to whether tobacco should be 
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“carved out” of the agreement’s ISDS provisions (Sy and Stumberg, 2014).  In an 
unprecedented move, it was ultimately agreed that there should be a form of tobacco carve 
out from the ISDS provisions of the TPP, although states would have to “opt in” to these 
alternative arrangements.  This significantly weakens the carve out, and means industry 
actors can lobby governments on an individual basis not to apply it.  Moreover, as McGrady 
(2007) has observed, the exclusion of tobacco from one trade or investment agreement may 
be undermined by its inclusion in other agreements, given TTCs’ ability to venue shop.  
Moreover, while specific carve outs for tobacco products may be regarded as a step forward 
for tobacco control, they raise questions about the adequacy of protections for other areas of 
public health policy under trade and investment agreements, including those related to 
alcoholic drinks and processed foods (Hawkins and Holden, 2016). 
 
In the TTIP negotiations, the ISDS provisions became so controversial that the European 
Commission proposed replacing ad hoc adjudication panels with a permanent investment 
court system (ICS).  This idea has now been incorporated within CETA.  Similarly, initial 
proposals for a highly-institutionalized form of regulatory cooperation, through the creation 
of a Regulatory Cooperation Council, were watered down in draft texts of the agreement 
released by the European Commission in March 2016.  These were replaced by vaguer 
commitments to create regulatory cooperation mechanisms which may be less formalized, 
but also less transparent and equally able to shape policy debates.  Delaying agreement on the 
precise form of the mechanism until after the agreement is finalized grants far-reaching 
delegated powers to the European Commission and the US government to put in place 
practices with significant democratic consequences, without the degree of scrutiny to which 
they are subjected during formal trade negotiations and ratification procedures.  
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The processes of ratification of trade and investment agreements allow us to see the 
importance of domestic political institutions for the success or otherwise of such agreements. 
National parliaments, as well as the European Parliament, have an important role in deciding 
whether agreements are ratified, and can therefore exert influence over the contents of those 
agreements, even where they cannot directly amend them.  In the US, Congress is required to 
ratify such agreements, but “fast track” or “trade promotion” authority has usually been 
granted to the President, under which Congress’ power is limited to passing or rejecting the 
treaty text as whole, without the ability to make detailed amendments to its provisions.  
 
In the EU, where an agreement is designated as a “mixed” agreement, that is, an agreement 
that includes areas of national as well as EU competence, agreements must be ratified not just 
by the European Parliament but by national governments in accordance with their own 
constitutional requirements.  This requires the agreement of 28 national and 10 regional 
parliaments.  In the case of CETA, the signing of the agreement was delayed due to the 
opposition of the Walloonian regional government in Belgium. A last-minute round of shuttle 
diplomacy between Canada, the EU member states and regional administrations led to the 
addition of supplementary protocols to the agreement to provide the Walloonian Assembly 
with further guarantees of its right to regulate in the public interest, and its ability to 
guarantee strong labour market, environmental and consumer standards.  The agreement was 
signed in a rearranged ceremony on 30
th
 October 2016, two days later than planned.  At the 
time of writing, the ratification process was yet to be completed. 
 
National governments must also take account of public opinion on agreements when seeking 
re-election, with TTIP becoming a key political issue in many EU member states. In the US, 
both TTIP and TPP, as well as the existing North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
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between the US, Canada and Mexico, were key issues in the 2016 Presidential election, with 
Donald Trump stating that he would withdraw the US from TPP on entering office and seek 
to renegotiate NAFTA. The degree to which TTIP became a political issue on both sides of 
the Atlantic may explain why it ultimately may not be enacted.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Trade and investment agreements have important implications for health, and tend to reduce 
the “policy space” within which national governments can make health policy. Measures to 
protect public health, that would otherwise violate trade law, must be justified on the basis of 
necessity and formulated so as to be as least trade-restrictive as possible. The WTO is the 
primary multilateral forum within which states can negotiate trade deals, and initiate disputes 
with each other where they think these have been violated. Yet WTO agreements are not the 
only form of international trade law; the multilateral trade regime encapsulated within the 
WTO is overlaid with multiple bilateral, regional and plurilateral agreements, which together 
constitute a confusing “spaghetti bowl” of agreements (Hawkins and Holden, 2016). 
Nevertheless, the WTO has provided an overarching institutional structure which, since its 
creation in 1995, has provided a relatively ordered and primarily multilateral approach to 
trade bargaining. This multilateral regime began to come under strain as the Doha Round fell 
into deadlock, with the US and the EU, in particular, seeking new “mega-regional” 
agreements outside of the WTO’s auspices. These new agreements, in turn, provoked 
substantial civil society opposition in both the US and the EU, as citizens began to question 
the value of ever-greater liberalisation and new pro-corporate legal mechanisms.  
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As the politics of trade becomes increasingly more contentious in the second decade of the 
21
st
 Century, it remains unclear whether there will be a continued move to greater trade and 
investment integration globally. The election of Donald Trump, and the ‘Brexit’ vote in the 
UK, indicated a rising tide of economic nationalism and a backlash against neo-liberal forms 
of globalisation. While the UK government’s vision, at the time of writing, was one of 
continuing neoliberal integration within the world market outside of the EU, in the US 
President Trump had indicated a desire to abandon TPP and possibly TTIP, to renegotiate 
NAFTA, and even to take protectionist measures against other states in a manner that might 
violate WTO law. Trump’s agenda has caused greater uncertainty about the progress of the 
global trade system, with a turn away from the post-World War Two liberal trading order 
towards a more volatile and nationalistic approach to international relations. It signifies a 
more instrumental approach to international politics, where the stability of global governance 
is of secondary importance to power-play between states, so that key aspects of contemporary 
global governance may be threatened, including the pre-eminence of the WTO in trade 
relations. It is unclear precisely what the impact of these developments might be on health 
policy at the national and global levels, although it raises the spectre that health issues may be 
sacrificed to the pursuit of a more narrowly-conceived view of national economic interest.  
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